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ARTICLES
THIRD PARTY REIMBURSEMENT
FOR PARTICIPATION IN CANCER
CLINICAL TRIALS:
A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
Gina Mazzariello Plaue*
Each year, approximately one million Americans are diagnosed
with cancer,' and although about half are cured, much remains un-
known about this disease. 2 Clinical trials for new treatments are the
primary method of testing new cancer drugs for efficacy and toxicity.
3
Indeed, in 1991, the American Medical Association (AMA) estimated
that broader participation in clinical trials could raise the cancer cure
rate to seventy-five percent by the year 2000. 4 However, currently
less than three percent of Americans diagnosed with cancer are en-
rolled in a clinical trial, while the remaining ninety-seven percent
continue to receive standard treatment.
5
Two primary reasons for lack of enrollment into clinical trials are
the unwillingness of doctors to refer their patients to these trials and
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1999; B.S., Syracuse University, 1993.
The author would like to dedicate this Article to its inspiration, the late Rudy
Plaue.
1. See American Medical Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs, Viability of
Cancer Clinical Research: Patient Accrual, Coverage, and Reimbursement, 83
J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. 254, 254 (1991) [hereinafter AMA on Scientific Af-
fairs].
2. See id.
3. See Dwight Kaufman, Cancer Therapy and the Randomized Clinical
Trial: Good Medicine? 72 CANCER SUPPLEMENT 2801, 2801 (1993); Robert J.
Levine, Ethics of Clinical Trials: Do They Help the Patient? 72 CANCER
SUPPLEMENT 2805, 2806 (1993).
4. See Melody L. Harness, What Is "Experimental" Medical Treatment?:
A Legislative Definition Is Needed, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 71 (1996).
5. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 254.
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the unwillingness of patients to participate. 6 The National Cancer In-
stitute (NCI), an institute of the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
has attempted to increase enrollment in clinical trials by initiating
educational programs for the general public, community programs to
involve more physicians in clinical trials, and informational programs
to give patients and doctors the information necessary to consider en-
rollment in clinical trials.7 In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) aided NIH in this effort by requiring the establishment of an
easily-accessible data bank of all clinical trials conducted for life-
threatening diseases. 8 These efforts are commendable, but do not re-
solve the fundamental problem confronting low enrollment in clinical
trials, namely, third party reimbursement for the costs of the trials.
Two types of costs are associated with clinical trials: research costs
and patient care costs.9 Although research costs are paid by the spon-
sor of the trial, usually a pharmaceutical company or the federal gov-
ernment through the NIH, patients are responsible for general patient
care costs.10 Historically, third parties reimbursed patients for these
costs," but over the past ten years the increase in managed care dra-
matically reduced this reimbursement. 2 Uriless third parties reverse
course and willingly pay for these costs, patient access to clinical tri-
als will continue to diminish.
Most third parties, including private insurers and federal programs
such as Medicare, do not currently reimburse patients for basic patient
costs associated with participation in clinical trials.' 3 These parties
believe that the trials are "experimental" or not "medically necessary"
and, therefore, fall outside the scope of coverage.' 4 Recently, how-
6. See id. at 254-55.
7. See infra, text accompanying notes 116-124.
8. See infra, text accompanying notes 125-129.
9. See Robert E. Wittes, Paying for Patient Care in Treatment Research
- Who is Responsible? 71 CANCER TREATMENT REP. 107, 109 (1987).
10. See Michael A. Friedman & Mary S. McCabe, Assigning Care Costs
Associated with Therapeutic Oncology Research. A Modest Proposal, 84 J.
NAT'L. CANCER INST. 760, 760 (1992). See also infra, text accompanying
notes 57-65.
11. See Wittes, supra note 9, at 109.




ever, there is a push to convince third-parties to pay for these costs.
15
In response, the federal government, through the Department of De-
fense (DoD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), agreed to
cover patient care costs for participation in clinical trials.' 6 Several
private insurance carriers are following the lead of the DoD and the
VA and are initiating the same policy. 17 Even more recently, the
American Association of Health Plans, a managed care trade associa-
tion, formed an agreement with the NIH to encourage managed care
organizations to cover patient care costs associated with clinical
trials.1
8
These efforts, though, do not guarantee access to clinical trials for
all Americans and, importantly, their continued vitality may depend
upon maintaining equal or lower costs for participation in clinical tri-
als as compared to the costs of standard treatment.' 9 While general
cost equality is one reason that reimbursing patients for participation
in clinical trials makes sense for third party payors, many other rea-
sons for such reimbursement also exist. First, participation in clinical
trials may constitute the best treatment alternative for seriously ill pa-
tients. 20 Second, many long-term benefits are available to both society
and third party payors from such reimbursement such as increased pa-
tient enrollment and the possibility for development of cheaper and/or
more effective treatment.2  However, because individual insurers are
primarily motivated by short-term cost 22 and are unlikely to respond to
long-term incentives without a guarantee that others will do the
same, 23 a legislative solution is necessary.
Six states statutorily mandate coverage of patient care costs associ-
ated with participation in clinical trials, 24 and thirteen others are con-
sidering passage of similar legislation. 25 Yet, even if all fifty states
15. See infra, text accompanying notes 213-220.
16. See infra, text accompanying notes 222-241.
17. See infra, text accompanying notes 251-257.
18. See infra, text accompanying notes 258-265.
19. See id.
20. See Levine, supra note 3, at 2806.
21. See infra, text accompanying notes 208-211.
22. See Walter Lawrence, Jr. et al., The Impact of Clinical Trial Protocols
on Patient Care Systems, 72 CANCER SUPPLEMENT 2839, 2840 (1993).
23. See infra, text accompanying notes 153-154.
24. See infra, text accompanying notes 269-285.
25. See sources cited infra note 285.
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were to follow suit, enormous gaps in coverage would remain because
of the large percentage of the population covered by Medicare and
Medicaid, which are not subject to state regulation,26 and because the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-
empts state law as applied to employer self-insured plans. 27 Thus, fed-
eral legislation mandating coverage of patient care costs associated
with participation in clinical trials by all third parties is needed.28
Congress should pass such a law to ensure that seriously ill patients
are not denied what may be the best alternative treatment and to real-
ize all the other long-term benefits associated with widespread partici-
pation in clinical trials.
Part I of this Article describes the aspects of a clinical trial. Part II
examines the problems of patient enrollment in clinical trials, includ-
ing the various efforts underway to increase this enrollment. Part III
describes the particular problem of third party failures to reimburse for
patient care costs associated with participation in clinical trials while
Part IV explores efforts being made by health benefits providers, in-
cluding the federal government and private insurance carriers, to com-
bat this problem. Parts V and VI examine legislative efforts by the
states and Congress to require insurers to pay or reimburse for these
costs. Finally, Part VII summarizes the argument for action at the
federal level in the form of comprehensive legislation to require all
health insurers to reimburse patients for these costs.
I. WHAT IS A CLINICAL TRIAL?
Clinical trials are part of the process by which a drug is tested to in-
sure that it meets the FDA's approval as "safe and effective." 29 To test
whether the drug is "safe and effective," the trials serve as the primary
method for determining efficacy and side effects of the drug on hu-
mans.3 0 Any sponsor wishing to conduct a clinical trial is first required
26. See infra note 148.
27. See infra, text accompanying notes 292-294.
28. See sources cited infra note 285.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 355 (1998). See also The Food and Drug Administra-
tion's Process For Approving New Drugs, Report of the Subcommittee on Sci-
ence, Research and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Tech-
nology, 96th Cong. (1980), in, PETER BARTON HUTT AND RICHARD A.
MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 514-516 (2nd ed.
1991) [hereinafter Subcommittee Report].
30. See id.
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to file a "Claimed Exemption for an Investigational New Drug"
(IND), 31 which includes all pre-clinical research data and a scientific
design of the human studies to be conducted. In addition, a sponsor
must gain approval of its plan by an Institutional Review Board (IRB)
in the institution where the drug will be tested.32 Typically, these
clinical trials are conducted in three phases, 33 which span four to six
years.34
A. The Three Phases of Clinical Trials
In Phase I, the purpose of the trial is to ensure the drug is safe for
humans3 and to determine the appropriate dosage.36 Phase I consists
of testing the drug on a small number of volunteers and/or patients,
37
usually numbering twenty to 100,
38 over a period of several months.
39
If no problems in human toleration of the drug surface, the trial moves
on to Phase II; however, if any testing subjects exhibit adverse effects,
which would limit the use of the drug, the trial is concluded and the
drug abandoned at this stage.40 Presently, approximately seventy per-
cent of drugs tested successfully complete Phase 1.41
Phase II involves the evaluation of the drug's efficacy by testing it
on those whom the drug is designed to treat.42 For example, in cancer
trials, Phase II studies focus on a particular type of cancer. 43 Up to
31. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1998) (outlining contents of an IND application).
32. See id.
33. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1998) (describing the three phases of clinical
trials). There are also "Phase IV" trials to continue evaluation of a drug after it
has been approved for market use. See 21 C.F.RI § 314.80 (1998).
34. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 29; Ken Flieger, Testing Drugs
in People, FDA CONSUMER, July 1, 1994.
35. See Flieger, supra note 34.
36. See James Metz, OncoTip: Becoming Involved in Clinical Research
Trials (last modified Feb. 14, 1999) <http://cancer.med.upenn.edu/support/
tips/tipl0.html>.
37. See Flieger, supra note 34.
38. Participants in Phase I clinical trials may or may not have the disease
which the drug is designed to treat. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 29.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Flieger, supra note 34.
42. See id.; Subcommittee Report, supra note 29.
43. See Understanding Clinical Trials - An Introduction (visited October
15, 1999) <http://cancertrials.nci.nih.gov/>.
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several hundred patients participate in these studies, which can last
from several months to two years. 44 If during this phase the drug ap-
pears to render the desired therapeutic effect, it continues to Phase
I1. 4 About thirty-three percent of drugs successfully complete Phase
11.46
The final phase, Phase III, is designed to compare the experimental
treatment against the standard treatment 47 to evaluate all aspects of
human consumption of the drug: its safety, dosage, and
effectiveness.4" The tests are conducted in a clinical setting 49 as ran-
dom, blind studies, where patients receive either the standard treat-
ment or the new treatment. 50 To be effective, Phase III studies require
participation from a large number of patients, usually several hundred
to several thousand,51 and can last anywhere from one to four years.52
Once a drug has completed at least one adequate and well-controlled
Phase III clinical trial, a New Drug Application (NDA) may be sub-
mitted to the FDA for approval 3 About twenty-five to thirty-three
percent of drugs successfully complete Phase III, with one in five
drugs eventually receiving marketing approval by the FDA.54
Clinical trials are generally sponsored by the pharmaceutical com-
pany that manufactures the drug under testing,5 5 but clinical trials may
44. See Flieger, supra note 34.
45. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 29.
46. See Flieger, supra note 34.
47. See Metz, supra note 36.
48. See Flieger, supra note 34.
49. Phase III clinical studies can successfully be conducted in cancer cen-
ters, university hospitals or community hospitals. See Lawrence, supra note
22, at 2840.
50. Placebos are also sometimes used as a control. See Subcommittee Re-
port, supra note 29. However, placebos are rarely used in the field of oncol-
ogy. See Levine, supra note 3, at 2809.
51. See Flieger, supra note 34.
52. See id.
53. Before 1997, a drug was usually expected to complete at least two
clinical studies. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 29. However, the Food
and Drug Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2310, § 115 (a)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (d) (1997)), clarified that completion
of one clinical study could be sufficient to establish "substantial evidence" of a
drug's effectiveness and thus qualify the drug for approval.
54. See Flieger, supra note 34.
55. See Understanding Clinical Research: From Promise to Practice (vis-
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also be sponsored by the federal government, through the NIH or some
other federal agency. 6 There are two types of costs associated with
participation in clinical trials: (1) the costs of doing the research itself
and (2) the costs of caring for the patient.5 7 Research costs generally
include costs for "data collection and management, research physician
and nurse time, analysis of results, and tests purely performed for re-
search purposes."58 The sponsor of the clinical trial generally pays for
these research costs. 59 Patient care costs fall into two categories: (1)
usual care costs and (2) extra care costs.6° Usual care costs include
doctor visits, hospital stays, clinical laboratory tests, x-rays, and other
similar costs, which would occur during cancer treatment whether or
not the patient is participating in a clinical trial.6' Extra care costs are
costs directly attributable to participation in the clinical trial,62 which
include, for example, hospitalization due to unexpected side effects of
an investigational drug.63 Patients are, for the most part, responsible
for paying all patient care costs. 64 Thus, these are the costs for which
patients seek reimbursement from third party payors.65
ited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://cancertrials.nci.nih.gov/> for information on clinical
trials sponsored by the NC.
56. See id.
57. See Wittes, supra note 9, at 109.
58. Clinical Trials and Insurance Coverage (visited Oct. 15, 1999)
<http://cancertrials.nci.nih.gov/> [hereinafter Insurance Coverage].
59. See Friedman & McCabe, supra note 10, at 760.
60. See Insurance Coverage, supra note 58.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Jane Erickson, Getting Managed Care to Pay for Clinical Trials,
ONCOLOGY TIMES, March 1996, at 1, 17.
64. See Friedman & McCabe, supra note 10, at 760.
65. Note that, although NCI states on its webpage that usual patient care
costs are "usually" covered by third parties, there is strong evidence to the
contrary. See Insurance Coverage, supra note 47. First, much of the legisla-
tion concerning reimbursement of patient care costs for participation in clinical
trials defines the patient care costs to be covered as those costs that would be
covered if the patient were not participating in a clinical trial. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.1 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., Insurance § 15-827 (1998);
H.R. 61, 106th Cong. (1999). This indicates that these costs are not currently
covered. In addition, commentators who have documented the decline in third
party reimbursement of patient care costs for participation in clinical trials and
argued for coverage have not distinguished between usual care costs and extra
care costs. See infra notes 203-220 and accompanying text.
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B. The Ethics of Clinical Trials
The ethics of clinical trials, particularly Phase III randomized trials,
is often debated.66 Although third party payors cite cost, not ethical
considerations, when denying payment, 67 examining the ethical con-
siderations of clinical trials is essential to understanding why paying
for them makes sense. There are two primary criticisms levied against
clinical trials: (1) randomized clinical trials are unethical because one
of the two therapies is superior to the other, thus unfairly injuring one-
half of the patients in the study by administering to them sub-standard
treatment; and (2) researchers encounter a conflict of interest between
the research aims of the study and the best interests of the individual
patients. 6' Both Criticisms stem from a basic misunderstanding of the
assumptions underlying clinical trials.
69
The key to refuting these criticisms is in recognizing that Phase III
clinical trials are based on the assumption that, although it is hoped
that the new treatment will turn out to be more effective than the stan-
dard treatment, both treatments are equally effective. One commen-
tator, Dwight Kaufman, notes
A new therapy always should have some putative or
theoretical advantage over standard therapy, and there
should be some reason to believe that the new therapy
might be more effective or less toxic than standard
therapy. The purpose of the Phase III trial is to prove or
disprove an advantage of the experimental therapy us-
ing some objective end point, such as a prolonged sur-
vival or disease-free interval, or lower toxicity with no
sacrifice in survival. The starting premise of any such
trial must be the recognition and honest declaration by
the investigators who design it and all reviewers of the
trial before its implementation,. that the answer to the
question being posed is unknown.70
This "null hypothesis" is termed "equipoise" by researchers. 71
Equipoise essentially guarantees that patients will receive one of the
66. See generally Kaufman, supra note 3.
67. See Lawrence, supra note 22, at 2840.
68. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2802. See also Levine, supra note 3, at
2808.
69. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2802.
70. Id.
71. See Levine, supra note 3, at 2806.
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best-known therapies for their condition by enrolling in a Phase III
clinical trial.7 2 In fact, the oncology community generally views en-
rollment in research protocols as the best available medical care and
"state-of-the-art" treatment.73 Thus, the underlying assumption of
equipoise directly contradicts the first ethical criticism of clinical tri-
als and severely undermines the second. As long as the care the pa-
tient receives is considered state-of-the-art, the research aims of the
study do not create a conflict of interest for the researcher.
Kaufman recognizes at least two criteria that must be fulfilled for a
clinical trial to be considered ethical: (1) an assumption that each arm
of the study is of equal effectiveness and (2) a promise the experiment
will be modified based on new information to the contrary. 74 In addi-
tion, a third criterion required to insure the clinical trial is ethical is
that the potential statistical difference in therapeutic outcomes must be
"important." 75 This third criterion is not a significant obstacle in can-
cer clinical trials because "moderate benefits of a particular therapy
may have great significance for cancer patients for whom no alterna-
tive therapy exists. 76 These foregoing criteria are all required by the
NCI before approving any drug for cancer clinical trials. 77 Conse-
quently, as a result of meeting these stringent criteria, patients en-
rolled in NCI-approved Phase III clinical trials are guaranteed to re-
ceive state-of-the-art treatment provided in an ethical fashion.
C. Costs and Benefits of Participating in Clinical Trials
In addition to the consideration that patients enrolled in clinical tri-
als receive the best treatment available, which is mostly applicable to
participation in Phase III trials, several other benefits to patients are
associated with participation in all phases of clinical trials. Most im-
72. See id. at 2807.
73. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 257. See also Walter
Lawrence, Patient Selection for Clinical Trials: Risks Versus Benefits and
Quality of Life Issues, 72 CANCER SUPPLEMENT 2798, 2798 (1993) ("the ma-
jority of investigators believe that the well-designed and properly implemented
clinical trial is the optimal treatment approach.").
74. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2803.
75. See id. The author suggests that "importance" should be measured by
whether the outcome will "make a meaningful difference in clinical practice or
in patient outcome[.]" Id.
76. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note i, at 254.
77. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2804.
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portantly, in clinical trials involving life-threatening diseases, the
treatment may prolong or even save patients' lives. 8 An added benefit
of clinical trials is that adherence to rigid treatment protocols tends to
result in optimal outcomes from the treatment.7 Patients may derive
great personal satisfaction from being a "teammate" in studies de-
signed to improve the management of their disease.80 For some poorer
patients, participation in these clinical trials may be the only way to
receive any medical care.81 In sum, evidence appears to show that pa-
tients enrolled in clinical trials do better than those receiving non-
82controlled. treatment. However, these benefits are not limited purely
to individuals. In fact, society as a whole benefits from participation
in clinical trials. "Clinical research is currently the only method for
demonstrating the safety and efficacy of new drugs and new technol-
ogy and for determining whether new therapies offer advantages over
existing, 'standard' therap[ies]. 8 3  For example, clinical trials are
particularly important in oncology, where they "are so integral to the
fabric of much cancer medicine. ' 4
Of course, there are both economic and non-economic costs associ-
ated with participation in a trial. The rigid protocol that may result in
optimal treatment is sometimes very difficult to follow. 85 There may
be an increased toxicity or a side effect from the treatment that is un-
78. Although, admittedly, drugs usually "reduce the risk of death, but
don't entirely eliminate it. They usually accomplish this by relieving the
symptoms of the illness[.]" Flieger, supra note 34.
79. See Lawrence, supra note 22, at 2799.
80. See id. See also Metz, supra note 34.
81. See Levine, supra note 3, at 2808.
82. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2804.
83. Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2801. See also AMA on Scientific Affairs,
supra note I, at 255 (noting that "[c]ontrolled clinical trials are the definitive
mechanism for evaluating the therapeutic effectiveness of new modalities.").
84. Wittes, supra note 9, at 112. One doctor has noted that clinical trials
are "how we essentially cured patients of leukemias and lymphomas. And all
the therapeutic advances that have been made in cancer were made through
clinical trials." Erickson, supra note 63, at 20. Finally, many people in the re-
search community feel that "oncology is different from other specialties in that
oncology depends on novel therapies to a greater extent than other diseases,
except perhaps AIDS." Susan Jenks, Does Managed Care Jeopardize Cancer
Research, 87 J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. 1102, 1103 (1995).
85. See Lawrence, supra note 22, at 2800.
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known at the time of the trial.8 6 The hope that the new treatment is
more effective or less toxic may not be realized; the logical conclusion
of equipoise is that sometimes the new treatment will actually be
worse than the standard treatment.8 7 Other costs to participation in
clinical trials also include practical considerations, such as the amount
of travel and time required and the concern over reimbursement for the
patient care costs associated with participation in the trial. Therefore,
before a patient enrolls in a clinical trial, these benefits and costs
should be thoroughly discussed with the patient's physician.
88
II. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN PATIENT ENROLLMENT
A. Problems with Patient Enrollment
The success of clinical trials depends on the enrollment of a suffi-
cient number of patients within a reasonable amount of time. "The
Phase III comparison trials must be designed to minimize the prob-
ability of erroneous conclusions by . . . minimizing all potential
sources of bias. This requires ...sufficiently large numbers of pa-
tients in each arm[.]"8 9 Success also depends on designing a trial that
"balance[s] all possible prognostic factors for natural history of the
disease and response[s] to therapy .... Such factors may include age,
performance status, gender, race and socioeconomic status of the pa-
tients[.] ' 9°
Despite the benefits described above, less than three percent of the
nearly one million cancer patients in the United States annually par-
ticipate in clinical trials.91 This low percentage of enrollment "im-
pedes timely completion of many cancer drug trials, has a negative
impact on the cancer cure rate, and exacerbates the problem of cover-
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Levine, supra note 3, at 2807. See also infra notes 99-102 and ac-
companying text, discussing the burdens managed care places on physicians'
abilities to thoroughly discuss treatment options with their patients.
89. Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2802.
90. Id. at 2803.
91. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 254 (Breaking down
accrual statistics: 1-1.5 percent of breast cancer patients, 1 percent of colon
cancer patients and .5 percent of rectal cancer patients are enrolled in clinical
trials. Three major clinical trial sponsor groups recently analyzed by the NCI
were operating at accrual rates slower than planned.).
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age disputes., 92 In fact, in 1991, it was estimated that "if 10% of pa-
tients with common tumors participated in clinical trials, most trials
could be completed within 1 year instead of the current 3 to 5 years. 93
There are two primary reasons for the lack of patient enrollment in
clinical trials: (1) unwillingness of physicians to recommend patients
to clinical trials and; (2) unwillingness of the patients to participate.
94
Several studies attempted to determine reasons why physicians are
reluctant to refer patients into clinical trials. The results of these
studies varied, 9 but each had a recurring theme: the physicians' belief
that their obligation of caring for the individual patient supersedes the
societal need to evaluate therapies that might be used more widely.
96
Several commentators suggest that the solution to this problem is to
educate physicians on the underlying assumptions of clinical research,
namely, that at all times the patient receives one of the best-known
treatments available.
97
92. Harness, supra note 4, at 70-71. See also AMA on Scientific Affairs,
supra note 1, at 254 ("it is critical that the predetermined sample size be at-
tained by entering eligible patients in cancer clinical trials in sufficient num-
bers and in a timely fashion. Presently, clinical research in cancer is being
threatened by inadequacies in the accrual of patients for the clinical trials.").
93. William B. Farrar, Clinical Trials: Access and Reimbursement, 67
CANCER 1779, 1780 (1991).
94. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 254-55. See also
Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2804.
95. See Farrar, supra note 93, at 1780 (finding the top three reasons. for
physician reluctance to enroll patients in clinical trials to be: (i) fear of losing
contact with the patient, (2) physician's belief that answers to a specific trial
are already known, and (3) the time required to discuss and implement a clini-
cal trial). See also AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note I, at 255 (summa-
rizing the results of two major studies on physician reluctance to enroll patients
in clinical trials. The first study, conducted by the National Surgical Adjuvant
Breast and Bowel Project, found the following reasons: (1) concern with the
doctor-patient relationship (73 percent), (2) trouble with informed consent (38
percent), (3) dislike of open discussions about uncertainty (23 percent), (4)
conflict within the physician as a clinician and as a scientist (18 percent), (5)
practical difficulties in trial procedures (9 percent), and (6) feelings of personal
responsibility if treatments are unequal (8 percent). Id. The second study
found that the primary reason for non-entry in 50 percent of the eligible pa-
tients was preference by the physician for a specific or alternate form of treat-
ment.). Id.
96. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 255.
97. See Farrar, supra note 93, at 1781. Another suggestion is to not only
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Another concern of physicians is that managed care places greater
limitations on physicians' ability to refer patients to clinical trials.98
Some physicians believe that discussing the costs and benefits of par-
ticipation in a clinical trial with a particular patient is too time-
consuming,99 because managed care grants incentives to physicians for
spending less and less time with their patients.'00 Managed care is
also criticized as affecting physicians' choice of treatment for other
reasons, namely, lack of third party reimbursement. "In cases where
obtaining approval for a particular treatment is time-consuming, or
where the patient is left wholly responsible for the bill, the physician
may think twice before offering the same treatment to another patient,
no matter what its advantages may be."' 0 '
Until recently, even if physicians wanted to refer their patients for
participation in a clinical trial, managed care could prevent them from
doing so through "gag" rules. A gag clause is one way that managed
care organizations (MCOs) attempt to contain costs by preventing
physicians from disclosing certain information to patients. 0 2 Such in-
formation includes the existence of treatment options not covered by
the MCO, such as participation in clinical trials. 0 3 Recently, however,
gag clauses have come under fire for interfering with the fundamental
doctor/patient relationship and interference with a physician's obliga-
tion to obtain informed consent from a patient to administer
treatment.104 Such "informed consent" requires that the patient be
educate physicians, but to involve them in clinical trials. See AMA on Scien-
tific Affairs, supra note 1, at 255. See also infra notes 116-20 and accompa-
nying text, discussing efforts to educate and involve physicians.
98. See infra notes 145 and 149 and accompanying text, discussing the
prevalence of managed care.
99. See Farrar, supra note 93, at 1780-81.
100. See Michael Misocky, The Patients' Bill of Rights: Managed Care
Under Siege, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 57, 69 (1998). One doctor
has complained "People in the [medical] community are trying so hard to sur-
vive, seeing twice as many patients and making half as much money, that they
don't enter people into clinical trials anymore." Erickson, supra note 63, at 17.
101. Karen Antman, Reimbursement Issues Facing Patients, Providers,
and Payers, 72 CANCER SUPPLEMENT 2842, 2843 (1993).
102. See Misocky, supra note 100, at 72.
103. See id. See also Bethany J. Spielman, After the Gag Episode: Physi-
cian Communication in Managed Care Organizations, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 437, 441 (1998).
104. See Misocky, supra note 100, at 74.
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aware of all relevant treatment alternatives. 10 5
Over one-half of the states ban the use of gag clauses in managed
care contracts. 10 6 The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
which administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs, also bans the
use of such clauses by MCOs that contract with Medicare and Medi-
caid. 107 Today, the general view regarding gag clauses is that their
presence in physician contracts with managed care organizations,0 8 is
overridden by the physician's ethical duty to disclose information re-
garding treatment options.109 Thus, this particular managed care prob-
lem should not pose a threat to communication about clinical trials. In
fact, the ensuing controversy suggests that physicians should be ethi-
cally obligated to discuss participation in clinical trials, at least in
cases where the physician believes that the treatment would be benefi-
cial.'' °
The most common reasons cited for patients' refusal to participate
in clinical trials are the concerns about experimentation, toxicity, and
certain costs."' The first two of these concerns can only be addressed
through further patient education. 1l2 The concern about costs, how-
ever, is a more global and complex problem. As discussed above, pa-
tients are responsible for the patient care costs associated with their
105. See id.
106. See Spielman, supra note 103, at 439 (listing states). Note, however,
that these laws are pre-empted by ERISA as applied to employer self-insured
plans. See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
107. See Spielman, supra note 102, at 451-52.
108. The actual prevalence of these clauses is unclear. Studies on the sub-
ject have conflicting results. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MANAGED CARE: EXPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO CONTRACT,
BUT PHYSICIAN CONCERNS REMAIN (1997) (finding gag clauses rare in man-
aged care contracts); Diane S. Swanson, Physician Gag Clauses - The Hypoc-
risy of the Hippocratic Oath, 21 S. ILL. U. L. J. 313, 314 (1997) (reaching op-
posite result).
109. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY
1242 (2nd ed. 1998).
10. See id. (suggesting that a federal statute be enacted to codify this
duty).
S11. See Farrar, supra note 93, at 1781; AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra
note 1, at 255.
112. See Farrar, supra note 93, at 1781. See also infra, text and accompa-
nying notes 120-22 (discussing efforts to increase patient education.).
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participation in a clinical trial." 3 In order to meet these costs, most
patients rely on their health insurance, but find that the insurance pro-
viders do not provide this coverage." 4 Thus, this lack of insurance
coverage is a "major contributing factor" to low enrollment in clinical
trials.'
B. Solutions to Enrollment Problems
In the early 1980s, the NCI took a first step toward improving pa-
tient enrollment in clinical trials by initiating community clinical on-
cology programs (CCOPs). 116 Realizing that community physician in-
volvement in clinical trial research" 7 would lead to increased physi-
cian referrals of patients into clinical trials, the NCI established
CCOPs to extend research to the community level." 8 At the time of
the NCI's initiative, approximately eighty-five percent of all cancer
patients received treatment at the community level." 9 Now operating
over fifty programs nationwide, CCOPs currently account for ap-
proximately fifty percent of all patients entered into formal NCI clini-
cal research protocols. 20
In 1988, the NCI initiated further action to increase patient enroll-
ment into clinical trials 121 by adopting a promotional campaign that
involved conducting seminars, placing feature stories in national and
local news media, and assisting in making information on clinical tri-
als available to physicians and patients.' 22 To assist in disseminating
information on clinical trials, the NCI developed the Physician Data
Query (PDQ), a database designed to provide information on available
NCI-sponsored clinical trials.' 23 NCI has expanded this effort via the
113. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (discussing the distri-
bution of insurers).
115. Laurent Castellucci, Maryland Bill Proposes Mandated Clinical Trial
Coverage, 90 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 423, 423 (1998).
116. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 255.
117. Seventy-two percent of physicians surveyed indicated that they would
be willing to be a clinical investigator. See id. at 256.
118. See id. at 255.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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Internet, where it employs an expansive website covering all major
topics of interest to providers and patients on clinical trials.
124
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA) provides another initiative, guaranteeing patients and pro-
viders access to information on all clinical drug trials being conducted
for "serious or life-threatening diseases.' ' 25 The legislation mandates
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting through the
Director of the NIH, establish and maintain a data bank of all clinical
trials, regardless of the funding source, for experimental treatments of
serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions. The Secretary must
disseminate the information through information systems "which shall
include toll-free telephone communications, available to individuals
with serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions, to other mem-
bers of the public, to health care providers, and to researchers.' 26 The
data bank must include the following information: (1) a description of
the purpose of each experimental drug, (2) eligibility criteria for par-
ticipation in the clinical trial, (3) a description of the location of trial
sites, and (4) a point of contact for those wanting to enroll in the
trial. 127 The information must be forwarded to the data bank by the
sponsor of the trial not more than twenty-one days after approval of
the protocol. 128 A sponsor can gain exemption from the law's require-
ments only after providing a "detailed certification" to the Secretary
ensuring that disclosure of the information "would substantially inter-
fere with the timely enrollment of subjects in the investigation."'
' 29
The impetus for this legislation began during testimony at a hearing
of the Senate Cancer Coalition in 1996, during which a constituent de-
scribed the difficulties cancer patients face in trying to find informa-
tion on experimental treatments. 130 Although the constituent acknowl-
edged that the existing NCI's Cancer Information Service was helpful,
she also testified that the system was incomplete because it did not in-
124. See generally Cancer Trials (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://cancertria
Is.nci.nih.gov>.
125. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2310 § 113 (codified as amended at 42





130. See 142 Cong. Rec. S9555 (Aug. 2, 1996) (testimony of Senators
Snowe and Feinstein) [hereinafter Snowe/Feinstein testimony].
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clude the 300-plus clinical trials sponsored by private pharmaceutical
companies.13 1 She compared the difficulty cancer patients face to the
ease with which AIDS patients can obtain information about clinical
trials due to the existing national databank of AIDS clinical trials. 32
Inspired by this constituent's testimony, an independent Senate
bill, 133 modeled after the 1988 AIDS legislation, was subsequently in-
corporated into FDAMA.134 The independent bill's sponsors, Senators
Olympia Snowe and Dianne Feinstein, recognized the many benefits.
of establishing such a data bank, including increased patient enroll-
ment into clinical trials:
All parties will benefit from this legislation. First and
foremost, it encourages patient choice and informed
decisions. But pharmaceutical companies will also
benefit, because this legislation will allow for easier
and quicker recruitment of individuals willing to par-
ticipate in experimental trials, expediting the approval
process for investigational new drugs .... But most im-
portantly, it will help save lives and reduce the suffer-
ing of Americans who are stricken by serious or life-
threatening illnesses.
35
These Senators also recognized the problem of third party reim-
bursement for costs associated with participation in these trials. "Pro-
viding people with information about clinical trials is only the first
step in increasing access to experimental treatments - we must also
ensure that they have adequate insurance coverage to cover costs asso-
ciated with clinical trials."'' 36 Although separate bills were introduced
at the time to remedy the insurance companies' failure to cover the
costs of clinical trials,137 the FDAMA itself did not comment on third
131. See id.
132. See id. In 1988, Congress established a national data bank of all
clinical trials for AIDS drugs, both publicly and privately funded, which AIDS
patients can access through a toll free number. See 42 U.S.C. § 300cc-17
(1988).
133. See S. 2024, 104th Cong. (1996).
134. See 143 Cong. Rec. S12241-02 (Nov. 9, 1997) (testimony of Senator
Jeffords).
135. Snowe/Feinstein testimony, supra note 130.
136. 143 Cong. Rec. S379-01 (Jan. 21, 1997) (testimony of Senator
Snowe).
137. See Improved Patient Access to Clinical Studies Act of 1997, S. 88,
105th Cong. (1997) (providing for reimbursement by most third parties of pa-
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party reimbursement for participation in clinical trials.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a system
meeting the FDAMA's minimum requirements could be created in two
years. 3 8 The estimated cost for the system totaled $215 million over
the 1998-2002 period, appropriating $20 million in 1998, $45 million
in 1999 and $50 million per year thereafter for maintenance and quality
improvement.139 The maintenance estimates were based on the cost of
maintaining the current data banks and information networks already
established by the NIH.
141
III. THE PROBLEM OF REIMBURSEMENT
Historically, patient care costs for participation in clinical trials
were paid by third party insurers.14 ' However, with the advent of
managed care and escalating health care costs, third parties are forced
to "retrench support for patients enrolled in clinical related trials."'
42
Specifically, a dramatic decline in reimbursement for all patient care
costs related to clinical trials occurred between 1987 and 1988.
4
1
Since 1988, the steady decline in reimbursement has continued, 44 and
tient care costs associated with participation in federally-approved clinical tri-
als).
138. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-3 10, at 46 (1997).
139. See id.
140. See id. Donald Ralbovsky, Information Specialist for the NIH, stated
in an interview on February 25, 1999 that the data bank is still under construc-
tion and not yet currently available. Mr. Ralbovsky anticipates that the data-
bases currently existing on the NCI web page will be incorporated into the data
bank upon its release to the public. See id.
141. See Wittes, supra note 9, at 109.
142. Antman, supra note 101, at 2844. See also Katie J. Smeltz, Bill Pro-
motes Medicare Coverage of Clinical Trials, 89 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 546,
547 (1997) ("[B]asic care costs such as hospital stays, laboratory tests, and phy-
sician charges used to be a routine part of health coverage for patients undergo-
ing cancer treatments. But with the advent of managed care, 'many private
health insurers are now denying coverage for routine care costs when a patient
enters a clinical trial for treatment."' (quoting Seth Rudnick, M.D.)). The re-
trenchment of support for patient care costs associated with participation in
clinical trials seemingly encompasses "usual" patient care costs that would oth-
erwise be covered. See supra note 65.
143. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 256.
144. See Nancy Nelson, Physicians and Insurers Debate the Future of
Clinical Trials, 88 J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. 1186, 1186 (1996).
Oliver W. Press, M.D., Ph.D., professor of medicine and
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currently, reimbursement for these costs is extremely inconsistent.
"One company may approve a patient for a clinical trial and another
carrier may not. Some pay for laboratory studies but not hospitaliza-
tion. Some pay for outpatient chemotherapy but will not pay for hos-
pitalization for complications from investigational therapy.' ' 45 Costs
are sometimes reimbursed for Phase III clinical trials, however, Phase
I and II costs are rarely reimbursed.
146
While the efforts described above certainly address many of the
problems in patient enrollment into clinical trials, they do not address
the major issue of who will ultimately pay for the patient care costs
associated with participation in a clinical trial. Approximately eighty-
eight percent of non-elderly Americans have private health care insur-
ance through their employer. 47 Most of these health plans, issued
through private employers, are governed by ERISA.148 Alternatively,
approximately nine million Americans are employees of the federal
government and are insured under plans issued by private carriers but
governed by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA).
149
These carriers contract with the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), which administers the program.' 5 Approximately seventy-
three percent of those Americans who obtain health insurance through
biological structure at the University of Washington
Medical Center in Seattle ... reported a change in insur-
ance coverage of patients in protocols in 1996 compared
with 1988. In the earlier trials ... 95% of patients were
covered by insurers, compared with 65% this year, de-
spite the fact that in the intervening years two papers
showed an increased survival with the experimental
treatment." Id.
145. Farrar, supra note 93, at 1781. One study estimate states that about
one-third of HMOs are clearly interested in funding research, another third are
not, and the remaining group is occasionally interested. See Nelson, supra
note 144, at 1188. A principal investigator for several NCI-funded bone mar-
row transplantation studies noted recently that between 15 percent and 40 per-
cent of patients recommended for transplantation were not treated because of
the refusal of third party insurers to pay for the treatment. See id. at 1186.
146. See Antman, supra note 101, at 2844.
147. See Nicole Weisenbom, ERISA Preemption and its Effect on State
Health Reform, 5 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 155 (1995).
148. See Edward G. Connette, Challenging Insurance Coverage Denials
Under ERISA, 34 TRIAL 20, 24 (May 1998). See also ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1001 etseq.
149. See Connette, supra note 148, at 24. See also 5 U.S.C. § 8901 et seq.
150. See id.
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their employer are enrolled in some type of managed care.' 5 ' The re-
maining portion of Americans are covered by the federal government
through either the Medicare or the Medicaid program, 152 the VA,' 53 or
the Department of Defense. 54 A growing number of Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries are also enrolled in managed care plans.
1 55
, All third party payors cite the same reason, in one form or another,
for refusing to reimburse for these costs. The providers consider the
treatment "investigational" or "experimental" and thus not cost effec-
tive. 56 The following section outlines litigation that has developed
over third party reimbursement of patient care costs in clinical trials,
then concludes by discussing the arguments in favor of third party
reimbursement of all phases of clinical trials.
A. Litigation
Most of the litigation challenging denial of coverage for participa-
tion in a clinical trial is brought under ERISA, 157 although there have
also been several cases against private non-ERISA plans, brought un-
der state law, and several cases against the OPM, brought under the
FEHBA.' 58 Plaintiffs usually seek coverage for participation in Phase
151. See Misocky, supra note 100, at 64.
152. Thirty million and twenty million respectively. See Charles D.
Weller, The Secret Life of the Dominant Form of Managed Care: Self-Insured
ERISA Networks, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 305, 311 (1996).
153. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
154. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
155. See John K. Iglehart, The Struggle to Reform Medicare, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1071, 1072 (1996) (stating that in 1996, four million Medicare
recipients - approximately 10 percent of all Medicare recipients - were en-
rolled in managed care plans); see also John K. lglehart, Medicaid and Man-
aged Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1727, 1728 (1995) (stating that in 1994, 7.8
million Medicaid recipients - approximately 35 percent of all Medicaid recipi-
ents -were enrolled in managed care plans).
156. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 256. See also infra
notes 244-48 and accompanying text, discussing exclusions by private insurers,
and notes 299-300 and accompanying text, discussing exclusions under Medi-
care.
157. ERISA preempts any state law claims based on denial of coverage.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (holding that state
lawsuit asserting improper benefit denial under ERISA-regulated plan was pre-
empted by ERISA); see also Weisenbom, supra note 147, at 153.
158. Before the agreement between the Department of Defense and the
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II clinical trials,'59 seeking one of three remedies: (1) reimbursement
for treatment already rendered, (2) a permanent injunction to prevent
the insurer from denying coverage, or (3) a preliminary injunction to
prevent the insurer from denying coverage in the period before a final
determination can be made. 160 Plaintiffs who bring claims under state
law may also seek compensatory damages for emotional distress or
pain and suffering. 161 Largely, however, defendants have escaped Ii-
NCI, there was at least one suit brought against the Office of Civilian Health
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). See infra
notes 234-40 and accompanying text; Wilson v. CHAMPUS, 65 F.3d 361 (4th
Cir. 1995). In Wilson, the court found that CHAMPUS had abused its discre-
tion in denying coverage for plaintiff's participation in a pre-phase III clinical
study of HDC/PSCR, because it relied on an unwritten agency policy mandat-
ing the completion of Phase III trials before a treatment is covered, when the
coverage regulations provided only that the treatment had to be "generally ac-
cepted." Id. at 366.
There have also been a growing number of cases brought under the Ameri-
.cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994), which
prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee on the basis of a
disability with regard to health care benefits. See Harness, supra note 4, at 90-
91. Plaintiffs in these cases claim that their employers are discriminating
against them by denying certain treatment for their disease, usually
HDC/AMBT for breast cancer, while covering the same treatment for a differ-
ent disease. See id. These cases are not fully applicable to the discussion here
because it focuses on denial of coverage because the treatment is administered
in a clinical trial, not because it is for a particular disease.
159. Twelve of the seventeen cases surveyed in this section involved cov-
erage for participation in a Phase II study.
160. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show: (a) that he
or she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction, and (b) ei-
ther (i) a likelihood of success on the merits or (ii) sufficiently serious ques-
tions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance
of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiffs favor. See Velez v. Prudential
Health Care Plan of New York, Inc., 943 F. Supp 332, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Although this burden is slightly lower than having to actually succeed on the
merits, the standard has not worked to plaintiffs' advantage, because in order to
determine the likelihood of success in such a fact specific inquiry, courts gen-
erally go through a thorough analysis of the claim.
161. See Lehman v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 806 F. Supp. 859,
860 (D. Ariz. 1992) (bringing state law bad faith claim and claim for emotional
distress against non-ERISA covered plan). ERISA does not allow for recovery
of extra-contractual damages, but may allow for recovery of attorneys' fees.
See Connette, supra note 148, at 24. See also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
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ability for denial of coverage for participation in clinical trials. 162 The
success of the plaintiff in these cases depends primarily on two fac-
tors: (1) the standard of review utilized by the court to evaluate the
denial of coverage and (2) the specific language of the coverage
agreement.
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review refers to the degree of deference a court al-
lows the plan administrator when reviewing the decision to deny
treatment. Typically, actions against ERISA plans are reviewed under
a de novo standard, which affords the plan administrator no particular
deference in evaluating the denial. 163 However, in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Burch, the Supreme Court held that if an ERISA plan
grants discretionary authority to decide coverage to the plan adminis-
trator, courts must review the plan administrator's decision under the
more deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 164 A court will
only overturn the coverage decision upon finding that the decision was
rendered in an arbitrary and capricious manner, given the plan's lan-
guage.'
65
The Firestone decision creates two obstacles for plaintiffs. First, it
is easy for a plan to avail itself of the heightened standard by simply
drafting a plan granting discretionary authority to the plan adminis-.
trator. Indeed, courts have found that a simple sentence granting dis-
cretion to the administrator will suffice. 166 Second, once the plan is
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (finding that punitive damages or extra-
contractual damages are not available under ERISA). In addition, most circuits
have found that FEHBA pre-empts any claims for extra-contractual damages.
See Brian Harr, FEHBA's Preemption Clause: Is It A Model For Private Em-
ployers'Subsidized Health Care?, 22 J. LEGIS. 267, 269 (1996).
162. Only four of the seventeen cases surveyed resulted in a favorable rul-
ing for the plaintiff. And in some cases, the favorable ruling meant only that
the plaintiff survived a motion for summary judgment - thus, there is no guar-
antee the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See Wolf v. Prudential Insurance Co.
of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 806 (10 Cir. 1995).
163. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989).
164: See id.
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Fortis Benefits Co., 1996 WL 18977, at *3
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding discretionary authority granted when plan stated "Our
Medical Board will make the determination as to the effectiveness of a treat-
ment"); Edens v. Central Benefits Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 900 F. Supp. 928, 933
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insulated by the heightened standard, it is difficult for plaintiffs to
prove a denial of coverage for participation in a clinical trial is "arbi-
trary and capricious," where the insurance plan contains any language
excluding "experimental" treatment. 167 Firestone, however, does pro-
vide a plaintiff the opportunity to modify the arbitrary and capricious
standard in its holding that if the plan administrator is "operating un-
der a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion."' 68 Courts find
such conflicts of interest when a plan administrator serves the dual
roles of decision-maker, with regard to the granting or denial of
claims, and insurer, whose incentives are to keep costs down. 169 Al-
though courts differ in the ways they "weigh" the conflict of interest,
(W.D. Tenn. 1995) (plan defines experimental as "any treatment . . .which
Central Benefits does notrecognize as accepted medical practice."); Jenkins v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 1994 WL 901184, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (plan states that "the Blue Cross Medical Director is responsible for de-
termining whether the use of any service is experimental."); Schnitker v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Nebraska, 787 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D. Neb. 1991) (plan
states that "we shall determine whether a service ... is investigative.").
167. See, e.g., Goldstein, 1996 WL 18977 at *6 (finding defendant's denial
of coverage for participation in Phase II cancer clinical trial not "arbitrary and
capricious" where plan contained a general exclusion of "experimental" or "in-
vestigative" treatments); Edens, 900 F. Supp. at 934 (same); Kost v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of Am., 1995 WL 359934, *5 (N.D. I11. 1995) (same, but plan did
contain explicit exclusion of "all phases of clinical trials"); but see Jenkins,
1994 WL 901184, at * 11 (finding where plaintiff sought coverage for partici-
pation in a Phase II study, that it is "arbitrary and capricious to conclude that
merely by use of the term 'study,' a treatment is rendered experimental," even
though plan listed ongoing clinical trials as a factor appropriate for considera-
tion when determining whether a treatment was experimental).
Note, however, that even de novo review might pose similar problems for
plaintiffs if they reach an appellate court. When reviewing a lower court's
judgment on denial of coverage, the appellate court will defer to the trial
court's finding of whether a medical procedure is covered by the agreement
unless that finding is "clearly erroneous." See Hendricks v. Central Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming trial court's finding
that coverage for participation in Phase II cancer clinical trial was excluded
under plan's general exclusion of "experimental" treatment). Some courts have
also noted in dicta that the outcome, favorable to the insurer, would have been
the same under de novo review. See Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d
706, 713 (7th Cir. 1993); Schnitker, 787 F. Supp. at 906.
168. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
169. See Velez, 943 F. Supp. at 339.
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certain conflicts can lead to a favorable result for the plaintiff.170
Under OPM regulations, an individual insured under the FEHBA
may appeal to the OPM for review of the insurance company's denial
of coverage. 171 Actions against the OPM, similar to some brought un-
der ERISA, are reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard. 7 2 However, before seeking judicial review of the decision, the
insured must first exhaust any administrative remedies. 173 Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, once the OPM issues its ruling, a court
can only overturn the decision if the ruling is found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.' 74
The applicable state law determines the standard of review for ac-
tions brought under state law. Usually, because state actions involve
breach of contract or allegations of bad faith, a court will review an
insurance company's decision using a "reasonableness" standard.
175
2. Policy Language
Once a court settles upon the appropriate standard of review, it
looks to the language of the policy to determine whether the denial of
coverage for participation in a clinical trial is warranted. One impor-
tant, but not determinative, factor is whether the plan specifically ex-
cludes participation in clinical trials.
For example, in Wolf v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Am., 76 the
plaintiff brought state claims of breach of contract and bad faith
against a non-ERISA private plan for denying coverage for participa-
tion in a Phase II clinical trial. The plaintiff received treatment in a
clinical trial from 1990-91, during which time the plan sponsor im-
plemented a new health plan. 177 When the plaintiff sought coverage
for the treatment in 1991, the insurer denied coverage as "experimen-
tal.' 78 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant
insurer on the basis that the plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary
170. See id. at 343.
171. See Harris, 992 F.2d at 707.
172. See id. at 712. See also 5 C.F.R. § 890.105 (1992).
173. See Harness, supra note 4, at 78.
174. Harris, 992 F.2d at 712. See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
175. See Wolf, 50 F.3d at 799; Lehman, 806 F. Supp. at 860.




of the plan, but left unanswered the question of whether the denial of
coverage was warranted by the plan's language. 79 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on the third party
beneficiary issue and proceeded to analyze the denial of coverage un-
der a "reasonableness" standard. 80 The court found the denial of cov-
erage reasonable under the new plan, which specifically excluded as
experimental "all phases of clinical trials," and granted summary
judgment to the defendant on that issue.' 8' However, the court did rule
that because the old plan contained only a general exclusion for "ex-
perimental" treatment, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the plan unjustifiably excluded the treatment, sufficient to
withstand defendant's motion for summary judgment.
182
Similarly, in Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Co., the Seventh Circuit
found that the OPM's denial of coverage for participation in a Phase II
clinical trial, where the plan's definition of "experimental" included
Phase I, II, or III trials, was not "arbitrary and capricious." 183 Also, in
Martin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Va.,1 s4 the Fourth Circuit also
found that it was not "arbitrary and capricious" for an ERISA plan to
deny coverage for participation in a Phase II clinical trial, where the
definition of "experimental" included "drugs that haven't received fi-
nal FDA approval."'8' 5 District courts have followed suit.
8 6
Interestingly, however, the reference to clinical trials in the defini-
tion of experimental is not always fatal to plaintiffs challenging denial
179. See id.
180. See id. at 798.
181. 50 F.3d at 799.
182. See id.
183. 992 F.2d at 713.
184. 115 F.3d 1201 (4th Cir. 1997).
185. Id. at 1209.
186. See Kost, 1995 WL 359934 at *5 (finding denial of coverage for par-
ticipation in a Phase II clinical trial not arbitrary and capricious where plan's
definition of experimental included all phases of clinical trials); Bushman v.
State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 915 F. Supp. 945, 953 (N.D. 11. 1996) (same
but plan excluded only Phase I and Phase II trials); Edens, 900 F.Supp. at 934
(same, but plan excluded treatments that were not "accepted medical practice"
or which did not have the required governmental approval); Watts v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 892 F.Supp. 737, 738 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (same,
but plan excluded treatments that did not have governmental approval); Schnit-
ker, 787 F.Supp. at 906 (same).
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of coverage. In Jenkins v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich.,' the
plaintiff sought coverage from her ERISA plan for treatment adminis-
tered as part of a Phase II clinical trial. Although the plan's language
provided that "[t]he service may be determined to be experimental or
investigational when there is ... an ongoing clinical trial," the court
held it arbitrary and capricious to deny this coverage.188 The court
based its decision on expert testimony, which stated:
All patients undergoing [ABMT] at the Cleveland
Clinic Foundation are part of a "study." We believe it is
vitally important that we continue to accrue data in a
logical and uniform way, in an effort [to] analyze the
current results, and hopefully improve upon our results
in the future. The only way to do this is through well
thought out, prospective trials. The fact that we are ac-
cumulating data on patients such as [the plaintiffl does
not mean that the procedure itself is experimental.'8
Thus, the court relied more on its own determination as to whether
the treatment was experimental than on the specific plan's language.
In Velez v. Prudential HMalth Care Plan of N. Y, the plaintiff sought
a preliminary injunction to prevent Prudential from denying coverage
of treatment administered as part of a "research protocol."' 90 Although
the plan's language provided for exclusion of treatment that "is under
study or in a clinical trial," the court held the denial of coverage to be
arbitrary and capricious.' 91 First, the court found the plan operated
under a conflict of interest, thus slightly modifying the standard of re-
view. 192 The court then noted that, despite the plan's language, Pru-
dential previously stated that it would fund single-dose treatment de-
scribed in research protocols. 193 Here, the court concluded Pruden-
tial's varying application of the exclusion supported the allegation that
Prudential abused its discretion in denying coverage. 194 In addition,
the court noted in sympathetic dicta that "the equities weigh in favor
of plaintiff. The urgency of plaintiff's request for relief and the fact
187. 1994 WL 901184, at *1.
188. Id. at *11.
189. Id.
190. 943 F.Supp. at 336.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 340. See also supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
193. See 943 F. Supp. at 343.
194. See id.
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that any delay in granting relief will diminish the treatment's chance
of success gravitate in favor of the relief sought."' 95 Thus, rather than
relying on the experimental status of the treatment, the court based its
decision on the behavior of the insurer itself.
Despite the sympathetic outcomes in Wolf, Jenkins, and Velez,
courts have found less specific language sufficient to uphold a denial
of coverage. In Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., the Seventh Circuit
found a contract which defined "medically necessary" as not including
treatment provided "in connection with medical or other research,"
unambiguous as a matter of law in reversing the district court's find-
ing that the contract did not exclude plaintiff's request for coverage
for participation in a Phase II trial. 196 Similarly, in Hendricks v. Cen-
tral Reserve Life Ins. Co.,197 the Fourth Circuit found the district court
not clearly erroneous in concluding that a plan which excluded treat-
ment "experimental in nature, which is not necessary to the treatment
of the illness and not generally accepted medical practice" properly
denied coverage for plaintiffs participation in a clinical trial.1
98
Although guided by law in making their decisions favoring defen-
dants, some judges have noted what they perceive as unfairness in the
outcome. One judge, after finding a denial of coverage for participa-
tion in a Phase II clinical trial not arbitrary and capricious, stated:
[T]he court cannot help but note that this result appears
to be unjust, unwise and unreasonable. . . .There are
two facts in this case that are brutally shocking to this
court. First, the procedure at issue is not some type of
voodoo or alternative medicine prescribed by someone
outside the mainstream of medical practice. To the
contrary, it is being prescribed by the head of a major
department of a highly respected medical institution.
Second, defendant's policy will pay large amounts of
money for conventional chemotherapy treatment, which
195. Id.
196. 18 F.3d 1405, 1411 (7th Cir. 1993)
197. 39 F.3d at 514.
198. A number of district courts have followed this rationale. See Gold-
stein, 1996 WL 18977, at *6 (finding defendant's denial of coverage for par-
ticipation in Phase II cancer clinical trial not "arbitrary and capricious" where
plan contained a general exclusion of "experimental" or "investigative" treat-
ments); Lehman, 806 F. Supp. at 865 (finding defendant's denial of coverage
for participation in a Phase II study reasonable where plan contained a general
exclusion of "experimental" treatments);
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according to the evidence will ultimately prove to be
futile. It will not, however, pay for [this treatment]
which apparently holds the only hope - however slim -
for plaintiffs long term survival. This paradox is non-
sensical, shortsighted, and cruel. 99
Another judge offered a personal message after finding for the de-
fendant. "While the Plaintiff did not prevail on the legal issues, the
admiration and hope for [the plaintiff] by all involved in this case, in-
cluding the Court, is heartfelt."200
In addition to the fairness concerns cited above, this case-by-case
fact specific analysis method takes up precious judicial time and re-
sources. 201 Routinely, judges are placed in the position of essentially
making decisions about the experimental status of medical procedures
about which the judge possesses no specialized expertise. 20 2 Thus, if
coverage for participation in clinical trials is the optimal outcome, the
justice system is not the optimal place to achieve it. The next section
outlines why coverage for participation in clinical trials is the optimal
outcome and suggests that the optimal means to achieve consistent
coverage is through legislation.
3. The Necessity for Reimbursement
The problems associated with excluding coverage for patient care
costs in clinical trials are widely cited in medical literature. With re-
spect to Phase III trials, a primary criticism is that the "investiga-
tional" exclusion is not properly applied when the theory of equipoise
is accepted with regard to a clinical trial. "In the appropriate clinical
setting (scientifically and ethically sound trials), investigational treat-
ment should be equated with 'state-of-the-art' care. Certainly the
'best' patient care should be covered by third party payors. ' 03 Along
the same lines, at least one commentator equates the problem, which
applies to refusal to reimburse for all phases of clinical trials, with ap-
plying the exclusion in situations involving terminal diseases. "Seri-
199. Bushman, 915 F.Supp. at 954-55.
200. Lehman, 806 F. Supp. at 866.
201. See Harness, supra note 4, at 90.
202. See id.
203. Karen Antman et al., The Crisis in Clinical Cancer Research, 319
NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 46, 47 (1988). See also Wittes, supra note 9, at 110 ("A
reasonable insurance system ought to reimburse all medical care that is effec-
tive, whether investigational or not.").
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ously ill patients may have exhausted more conventional remedies,
and the best treatment for them may be available only through partici-
pation in a clinical trial. ' 2°
A second criticism, also applicable for refusals to reimburse for all
Phases of clinical trials, is that these decisions may not be logically or
economically sound, as patients would incur many of these costs in the
course of traditional, yet ineffective, treatment. As such, these costs
would ostensibly be covered by third party payors. °5 Furthermore,
these exclusions often result in the denial of reimbursement for other-
wise "legitimate" costs, if incurred in conjunction with "investiga-
tional" costs, because insurers are unwilling to undertake the tedious
206task of itemizing care.
Even if reimbursing investigational costs is not economical in the
short term, reimbursement of all Phases of clinical trials will pay divi-
dends in the long term, both for the insurers and for society as a
whole. Clinical trials may lead to treatment that is more effective and
204. AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 257. Commentators have
additionally recognized that these types of exclusions essentially allow third
parties to make treatment decisions. See Farrar, supra note 93, at 1781.
205. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text discussing the distinc-
tion between usual patient care costs and extra care costs. See also Kaufman,
supra note 3, at 2804 ("An insurance carrier or other third party payer clearly
would be contractually obligated to pay for the control arm, which is received
by half the patients on the trial. The denial of coverage for patients in a ran-
domized trial on the basis of its being 'experimental' is an absurd breach of (at
least) faith."). See also Antman et al., supra note 203, at 47; AMA on Scien-
tific Affairs, supra note 1, at 257.
206. See Wittes, supra note 9, at 109. The author provides a useful exam-
ple:
A patient with metastatic breast cancer, previously treated with
standard combination chemotherapy and appropriate hormonal
maneuvers, is hospitalized for progressive cancer and hypercalce-
mia. Institution of a saline diuresis and glucocorticoids fails to
control the serum calcium adequately, so on Day 10 her physicians
begin cytotoxic therapy with an nvestigational agent that has
shown promising initial evidence of activity in breast cancer dur-
ing the early phase II trials. This agent must be given by continu-ous infusion over 5 days. The serum calcium normalizes, and the
patient.is discharged 8 days after start of therapy.
Id. Clearly, the first nine days of hospitalization are attributable to conven-tional care, but the remaining eight are unclear. Most insurers would deny all
coverage because of the treatment's "experimental" nature. See id. This isunjustified if the treatment happens to be the most promising treatment avail-
able or if there is no good alternative conventional therapy. See id.
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cheaper than the current standard treatment. 20 7 Even if the result is not
cheaper treatment, third parties will obtain data to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the therapy, which is what insurers claim they want when
applying these "investigational" exclusions. 20 8 Furthermore, if effec-
tive, the treatment could return a cured cancer patient to the work
force more quickly, thereby placing the patient back in a position to
contribute to society. 20 9 Finally, such reimbursement will insure that
clinical research is conducted effectively and efficiently by increasing
patient enrollment to clinical trials.
210
While'these arguments appear persuasive, a further problem lurks in
the background. Unfortunately, a long-term analysis by an individual
insurer would only lead the insurer to reimburse these costs if it could
be assured that others would do the same. In other words, this pres-
ents a classic collective action problem.211 Thus, while patient and
physician education may alleviate some accrual concerns, reimburse-
ment concerns require further action in the form of regulation to
achieve optimal behavior on the part of insurers, at least until short
term cost comparisons can be developed.
Since the severe reduction in reimbursement for patient care costs of
clinical trials in the late 1980s, 212 several industry leaders and com-
mentators have argued that third party pay'ors should bear responsibil-
ity for these costs. In 1989, the NCI issued a formal statement rec-
ommending that third party coverage be allowed for patient care costs
of all nationally approved cancer treatment research protocols. 213 The
207. See id. at 110. Sometimes trials will result in more effective, but
more expensive treatment. See id.
208. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 257.
209. See Wittes, supra note 9, at 110.
210. One commentator points out that when third parties deny payment,
only affluent people will have access to the care. See Antman et al., supra note
202, at 48. This could seriously undermine the need for a wide range of socio-
economic and racial participants. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
There is also further support for why Phase I and Phase II trials should also be
reimbursed - without them, there would be no Phase III trials. See Farrar, su-
pra note 92, at 1782. In addition, "patients in these studies are receiving a
therapeutic approach that, in the judgment of the treating physician and his
peers on the local IRB and at the sponsoring organization, is appropriate medi-
cal care under the circumstances." Wittes, supra note 9, at 112.
211. See Witts, supra note 9, at 112.
212. See id.
213. Impact of Third party Reimbursement on Cancer Clinical Investiga-
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statement also urged third party coverage be allowed for all cancer
treatment research protocols not subject to national approval, provided
that the protocol has been approved by "established peer-review
mechanisms. '" 21 4 The NCI issued this statement after reasoning that
the denial of payment for patient care costs on clinical trials "threatens
to impede the development of effective new therapies and severely




Some commentators similarly recognizing this problem argue that,
third parties should pay these patient care costs, but do not focus on
ways in which to effectuate this change. The recommendations range
from the narrow, such as third parties should reimburse only for Phase
III randomized clinical trials, 216 or third parties should reimburse only
for nationally approved clinical trials, 217 to the broad, such as third-
parties should pay for all Phases of clinical trials approved by an
IRB. 1 8 Other commentators focus on the federal government as the
solution to the problem, both as an employer and as a regulator.2 ' 9 For
example, one commentator suggests that Congress require Medicare to
cover patient care costs associated with clinical trials.22° In compari-
son, at least one commentator suggests that legislation take place at
both the state and federal level to provide universal coverage for all
221patients.
As the first part of this section highlighted, judicial time and re-
sources are unnecessarily used to solve these problems on a case-by-
case basis.222 In addition, patients are losing precious time as they
wage these legal battles with their insurers. As the second part has
tion: A Consensus Statement Coordinated by the National Cancer Institute, re-
printed in 81 J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. 1585, 1585 (1989).
214. Id.
215, Id.
216. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 2804; see also Levine, supra note 3, at
2810.
217. See AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 258; Friedman and
McCabe, supra note 10, at 761-62.
218. See Wittes, supra note 9, at 112.
219. See Antman et al., supra note 203, at 48; see also Wittes, supra note
9, at 112.; Erickson, supra note 63, at 17.
220. See Antman et al., supra note 203, at 48.
221. See Erickson, supra note 63, at 19.
222. See Harness, supra note 4, at 90.
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shown, reimbursement for clinical trials is a logical step for insurance
companies to take and, thus, should not be left to inconsistent cover-
age as is currently the case. Action must be taken at the federal level
to guarantee patient access to the important treatments provided
through clinical trials.
IV. INSURER EFFORTS AT REIMBURSEMENT
A. The Federal Government's Response
The VA provides health care benefits to veterans of the U.S. armed
forces. 223 It operates an extensive health care delivery system that in-
cludes 173 medical centers and more than 400 clinics, serving ap-
proximately 2.9 million veterans annually. 224 The VA and the NCI
have a longstanding working relationship in the battle against cancer:
"[t]he VA has long recognized its responsibility to participate in na-
tional efforts to lessen the burden of cancer, which is a particularly
important threat to the VA patient population."
225
In 1997, the VA and the NCI entered into a formal agreement "to
expand the already productive relationship between the VA and the
NCI into a more formal and extensive partnership. '226 The funda-
mental features of the agreement are to increase the access of eligible
veterans to NCI-sponsored clinical trials and to provide VA clinical
investigators with expanded opportunities to participate in clinical
cancer research.227 Specifically, the VA now reimburses beneficiaries
for previously uncovered patient care costs for eligible veterans' par-
ticipation in NCI-sponsored clinical trials, either at VA sites, or in
some circumstances, at non-VA sites.228  Over the three years the
agreement is in effect, the VA and the NCI will collect information to
evaluate the project, including information on clinical trial enrollment,
223. See Interagency Agreement Between the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs and the National Cancer Institute for a Partnership in Clinical Trials for






228. See VA Interagency Agreement, supra note 223.
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resource utilization and relative costs.
229
The DoD provides medical services and support to members of the
armed forces and their families.230 The program, called TRICARE,
provides these services to approximately 8.3 million beneficiaries, ei-
ther through a direct care system, comprised of 120 military medical
treatment facilities (MTFs), or through care purchased from civilian
providers who are reimbursed by the DoD through the Civilian Health
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).2,3 In
1994, the DoD established a demonstration project, which provided
CHAMPUS reimbursement for eligible beneficiaries who received
previously uncovered treatment for breast cancer under approved NCI
trials for high dose chemotherapy with stem cell rescue
(HDC/SCR).232 The purpose of the trial was to "improve beneficiary
access to promising new therapies, assist in meeting the NCI's clinical
trials goals, and arrival at conclusions regarding the safety and effi-
cacy of HDC/SCR in the treatment of breast cancer.' 233 In 1996, the
DoD signed an interagency agreement with the NC 2 34 to expand the
demonstration project to include all NCI-sponsored Phase II and III
clinical trials.235 Beneficiaries can participate in trials either through
NCI-approved MTFs or through CHAMPUS-reimbursed civilian
care. 236 The DoD stated its purpose for entering the agreement as fol-
lows:
DoD shares public and scientific concern about disap-
pointing cure rates under standard cancer therapies and
has an interest and a responsibility to participate in the
appropriate evaluation of improved therapeutic ap-
proaches for DoD patients. Through this agreement,
DoD will have access to clinical research and patients
can receive state-of-art care through NCI-sponsored
clinical trials throughout the country by participating in
229. See id.
230. See Interagency Agreement Between the Department of Defense and
National Cancer Institute For Partnership in Clinical Trials for Cancer (last





234. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1092.
235. See DoD Interagency Agreement, supra note 230.
236. See id.
2000]
338 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 16:305
the evaluation of emerging new therapies that have sig-
nificant 2 3promise for the successful treatment of
cancers.
The demonstration project began on January 1, 1996, and was
scheduled to last one year. The DoD extended the project until De-
cember 31, 1999,239 because the Department hypothesized that this
"increased access to innovative cancer therapies will occur at a cost
comparable to that... experienced in paying for conventional thera-
pies under the standard CHAMPUS program. Results of this demon-
stration will provide a framework for determining the scope of DoD's
continued participation in the NCI's research efforts. 2 40 As of Janu-
ary 1998, approximately ninety-one cases had been funded under this
agreement, including care for solid tumors, hematologic malignancies,
and other tumors.2 4' Based on these results, certain comments have
hailed this agreement as a turning point in spurring managed care into
providing reimbursement for clinical trials.
2 42
B. Private Insurance Carriers
Reimbursement policies of private insurers are inconsistent.
2 43
Virtually all plans exclude coverage for experimental treatment, but
the specific policy language differs among the many insurers. 44 Some
plans list the treatments they consider experimental or list the treat-
ment they cover, implying that treatments not listed are not covered. 45
Other policies defer to approval by government agencies, usually the
FDA, to determine whether a treatment is experimental,246 while some
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. See Notice of Extension of Cancer Treatment Clinical Trials Demon-
stration Project (last modified Dec. 18, 1998) < http//www.tricare.osd.mil/>.
240. Id.
241. See Doris Browne, et al., Oncology Services: The Department of De-
fense Perspective, 82 CANCER SUPPLEMENT 2010, 2013 (1998).
242. See Erickson, supra note 63, at 17.
243. See Troy Parkins, Clinical Trial Reimbursement Reform Sought, 85 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 1549, 1550 (1993).
244. See Connette, supra note 148, at 22.
245. See id. See also Jenkins, 1994 WL 901184 at *5.
246. See Connette, supra note 148, at 22. See also Martin, 115 F.3d at
1205. At least one commentator has suggested that reliance on FDA approval
"is really most unsuitable for reimbursement decision-making." Wittes, supra
note 9, at 108. This is because a pharmaceutical company's decision to seek
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plans reserve discretion to determine which treatments are experi-
mental. 247 The latter type of clause is usually accompanied by a vari-
ety of factors the plan will use in making its determinations.
24 8
The overwhelming reason for denying this coverage is the perceived
additional costs. 2 49 Some insurers argue that they fear litigation not
from people enrolled in trials but from those wanting to receive the
treatment. 250 However, at least one case holds that a contractual
agreement to cover costs associated with a clinical trial does not create
an obligation to cover the same treatment when not administered in a
clinical trial.25' Thus, it appears that if insurers could be convinced
that costs for participation in clinical trials are not significantly higher
than costs for standard treatment, they might agree to pay for the "ex-
perimental" treatment.
Some insurers have at least expressed willingness to test the cost
comparison of clinical trial treatments versus standard treatments.
Specifically, Ohio Med, one of five health plans covering approxi-
mately 100,000 Ohio state employees, recently announced a new
three-year demonstration project based upon the agreement between
the DoD and the NIH. 52 The project covers all previously uncovered
patient care costs that are associated with participation in an NCI-
approved Phase II or Phase III cancer clinical trial.253 On a larger
scale, pursuant to a groundbreaking agreement, United HealthCare, a
large MCO based in Minnetonka, Minnesota, now covers the costs of
its members enrolled in NCI-sponsored clinical trials. 4 More spe-
FDA approval of a drug "is a complex business decision that depends on many
factors other than the scientific evidence supporting the claim." Id.
247. See Connette, supra note 148, at 22. See also Schnitker, 787 F.Supp.
at 904. Note that this can affect the standard of review used to evaluate a
plan's denial of benefits. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
248. See Schnitker, 787 F. Supp. at 904.
249. See Lawrence, supra note 21, at 2840.
250. See Parkins, supra note 243, at 1550. See Jenks, supra note 83, at
1104.
251. See Dodd v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assoc., 835 F. Supp. 888,
890 (E.D.Va. 1993) (finding that notice of demonstration project for desired
treatment did not obligate plan to provide coverage for treatment outside proj-
ect).
252. See Ohio State Employee Health Plan to Cover NCI-Sponsored Trials
(visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http//cancertrials.nci.nih.gov/>.
253. See id.
254. See Cancer Clinical Trials Pilot Program Launched by United
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cifically, in late 1998, United and the Coalition of National Cancer
Cooperative Groups, Inc., created the Clinical Trials Pilot Program, in
which United members can enroll in clinical trials sponsored by mem-
bers of the Coalition. 5 Formed in November 1997, the Coalition is a
non-profit foundation comprised of six of the twelve Cooperative
Groups sponsored by NC1256 and boasts 12,000 cancer researchers na-
tionwide. 7  Through this unique agreement, United, with thirteen
million members in thirty-two states, will provide thousands of pa-
tients with access to clinical trials while setting an example for other
members in the managed care industry.
Finally, a recent agreement with a trade group of the managed care
industry offers some promise that managed care will pay for patient
care costs associated with clinical trials. In February 1999, the NIH
and the AAHP reached an agreement to work together to increase pa-
tient participation in NIH-sponsored clinical trials. 259 The AAHP, or-
ganized in 1997, serves as the official trade group of the managed care
industry 260 and presently has more than 1,000 members that provide
care for 100 million Americans nationwide. 6 Under this agreement,
the AAHP is encouraging its members to "reimburse the routine pa-
tient-care costs associated with NIH-sponsored clinical trials, provided
these costs are not substantially higher than the costs a plan would in-
cur in the course of standard treatment." 262 One function of this
agreement will be to study the costs of participation in clinical trials
HealthCare and Cooperative Coalition to Pay Patient Care Costs (last modi-
fied Nov. 25, 1998) <http//cancertrials.nci.nih.gov/>.
255. See id.
256. See id. The Coalition members are: Eastern Cooperative Oncology
Group, Cancer and Leukemia Group B, North Central Cancer Treatment
Group, National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Program, Radiation
Treatment Oncology Group, and Pediatric Oncology Group. See id.
257. See Robert Pear, Managed-Care Plans Agree to Help Pay the Costs of
Their Members in Clinical Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A2 1.
258. See id.
259. See Agreement between the National Institutes of Health and the
American Association of HealthPlans in Support of Clinical Trials (last modi-
fied Feb. 23, 1999) <http/cancertrials.nci.nih.gov> [hereinafter AAHP Agree-
ment].
260. See AAHP Membership Information (visited Oct. 15, 1999)
<http//www.aahp.org>.
261. See id.
262. Pear, supra note 257, at A21.
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compared to standard treatment. 263 The agreement is expected to lead
to more programs like the United Healthcare project described
supra.
264
According to the NIH, this agreement is based on a "set of jointly
held principles:"
* clinical trials are the most effective means of gener-
ating reliable evidence relating to medical interven-
tions;
* NIH is committed to supporting the conduct of this
research as the means of identifying therapeutic ad-
vances that are then translated into standards of patient
care;
- health plans have the potential to create new opportu-
nities to increase patient enrollment, conduct clinical
research, disseminate research findings, and incorporate
research advances into routine medical practice;
; AAHP is committed to increasing the participation of
plan members in well-designed, high quality clinical
trials;
- and plans are more likely to facilitate and encourage
clinical trials participation if it is not markedly more
expensive to the plan than standard clinical care.
Importantly, these principles indicate that MCOs recognize the critical
role they play in cancer research. To evaluate the elements of the
agreement, a steering committee consisting of five NIH representa-
tives, five AAHP representatives and three patient advocates will re-
port on the agreement's progress on a yearly basis.
266
The efforts discussed in this section are certainly commendable.
The reliance on comparable costs in most of these efforts, however,
suggests that insurers are mostly focusing on the short term. Given
this view, regulation again appears as the most effective medium to
ensure consistent reimbursement until the nature of clinical trials costs
in relation to standard treatment is established.
V. STATE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
Some states have enacted legislation mandating that insurance com-
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panies provide coverage for routine medical costs associated with en-
rollment in cancer clinical trials. For example, in Rhode Island, cov-
erage is mandated for Phase II, III and IV cancer clinical trials267 un-
der the following circumstances: (1) the clinical trial has been ap-
proved by the NIH, Community Clinical Oncology Programs, the
FDA, the Department of Veterans' Affairs, or otherwise meets NCI
guidelines; (2) the trial is approved by an IRB; (3) the personnel pro-
viding the treatment are "capable of doing so by virtue of their experi-
ence, training, and volume of patients treated to maintain expertise;"
(4) the patient meets all protocol requirements; (5) there is no clearly
superior, non-investigational treatment available; and (6) the available
data provide a reasonable expectation that the treatment will be at least
as efficacious as its alternative.268 Georgia mandates coverage for
"routine patient care costs" of dependent children enrolled in Phase II
or Phase III clinical trials that are approved by the FDA or the NCI for
the treatment of cancer that generally first manifests itself in children
under nineteen. 269 "Routine patient care costs" include "blood tests,
X-rays, bone scans, magnetic resonance images, patient visits, hospital
stays, or other similar costs" that would normally be covered if the
beneficiary were not enrolled in a clinical trial. 270 The statute clari-
fies, however, that "[i]t is specifically the intent of this Code section
not to relieve the sponsor of a clinical trial program of financial re-
sponsibility for accepted costs of such program."27'
In Virginia, coverage is mandated for "patient costs incurred during
participation in clinical trials for treatment studies on cancer" if the
treatment is being conducted in a federally-approved Phase II, III, or
IV clinical trial.272 However, this law only applies if: (1) "There is no
clearly superior, non-investigational treatment alternative;" (2) there is
a "reasonable expectation" that the treatment will be at least as effec-
tive as the non-investigational treatment alternative, and (3) the patient
and the health care provider both deem that the patient's participation
267. But coverage for Phase 11 clinical trials expired on December 31,
1999. See R.1. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-36.2 (1998) (insurance policies); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 27-41-41.2 (1998) (HMOs).
268. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-36.2 (1998) (insurance policies); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-41-41.2 (1998) (HMOs).
269. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.1 (1998).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.8 (1999).
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in the clinical trial is "appropriate. 273 Similar to Virginia, Louisiana
mandates coverage for patient costs if treatment is being provided in a
Phase II, III or IV clinical trial for cancer.274 The law further defines
"patient costs" as costs that "are incurred as part of the protocol treat-
ment being provided to the patient for purposes of clinical trial. 275
Such costs do not include: (1) non-health care service costs; (2) costs
associated with managing the research data associated with the clinical
trial and; (3) the cost of investigational devices or drugs.276 Addition-
ally, beginning January 1, 2000, coverage is mandated in Illinois for
routine patient care costs incurred during treatment in a federally-
approved Phase II, III or IV cancer clinical trial.277 However, cover-
age is limited to trials conducted in Illinois, with an annual benefit
limit of $10,000,278 and terminates on January 1, 2003. The purpose of
the mandate is to generate data to study the costs and benefits derived
from coverage of these costs.
279
In by far the most expansive legislation, Maryland enacted a statute
in 1998 mandating coverage of routine patient care costs incurred
during Phase I, II, III and IV clinical trials for cancer treatment and
Phase II, III and IV clinical trials for treatment of other life-
threatening diseases.80 Coverage is required if: (1) the clinical trial is
approved by the NIH, the FDA, the VA, or an IRB of an institution in
Maryland which has a multiple project assurance contract approved by
the NIH; (2) the personnel providing the treatment are "capable of
doing so by virtue of their experience, training and volume of patients
treated to maintain expertise;" (3) there is no clearly superior non-
investigational alternative; and (4) the available data provide a reason-
able expectation the treatment will be at least as effective as its alter-
native.281 The statute requires any entity seeking coverage to post in-
formation electronically and keep an up-to-date list of all clinical trials
273. Id.
274. See Act of July 12, 1999, 1999 LA. SESS. LAW SERV. 1357 (S.B. 761)
(West) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:230.3).
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. See Act of August 3, 1999, 1999 ILL. LEGIS. SERV. 91-406 (H.B.
1622) (West) (to be codified at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1405/56.3).
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See MD. CODE ANN., Insurance § 15-827 (1998).
281. See id.
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meeting the statute's requirements. 82
The Maryland legislation is hailed as a much-needed first step to-
ward breaking down the barriers to clinical trial participation. Dr.
Barry Meisenberg, Director of Hematology and Oncology at the Uni-
versity of Maryland Hospital, Baltimore, states, "[i]f insurers in
Maryland, home of the NIH and the FDA, don't go out of business...
others will be less likely to oppose such legislation in the future. 28 3
This type of legislation "signal[s] a major change in how clinical trials
are perceived - by the public and payors alike," 284 because it will help
eliminate the myth that patients in clinical trials are just "guinea pigs."
The ultimate result is that patients, as well as payors, will be more
likely to see the benefits of clinical trials.
285
Following the lead of these states, legislation is being considered in
thirteen other states to require insurers to reimburse patients for pa-
tient care costs associated with participation in various types of clini-
cal trials.286 In addition, some states require reimbursement for a par-
ticular treatment, ostensibly including Ahen it is conducted as part of a
clinical trial, most notably high-dose chemotherapy supported by
autologous bone marrow transplantation for breast cancer.
287
282. See id.
283. Castellucci, supra note 115, at 423.
284. Diane Naughton, Paying the Price for Progress; New Maryland Law
Requires Insurers to Cover Patients' Costs in Clinical Trials, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16557582, at 139.
285. See id.
286. See H.C.R. 2004, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1999); A.B. 591,
Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1999); S.B. 132, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1999); S.B. 396, lllth
Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1999); S.B. 668, 119th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me.
1999); H.B. 2916, 181st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 1999); S.B. 953, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 1999); S.B. 311, 90th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999); A.B. 6257,
222nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); S.B. 982, Gen. Assem. (N.C. 1999); H.B.
1681, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1999); S.B. 658, 183rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
1999); H.B. 372, 65th Leg. (Vt. 1999).
287. Over the past few years, there has been an ongoing controversy over
the efficacy of HDC/ABMT in the treatment of breast cancer and a barrage of
litigation involving insurance companies' denial of coverage for the treatment
because it is experimental. For an excellent discussion of the HDC/ABMT
controversy and the resulting state legislation mandating its coverage, see
Denise S. Wolf, Who Should Pay for Experimental Treatments? Breast Can-
cer Patients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2029 (1995). See also U.S.
General Accounting Office, Health Insurance - Coverage of Autologous Bone
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Although state initiatives to mandate coverage of participation in
clinical trials are certainly steps in the right direction, they have many
limitations. First, they do not cover Medicare and Medicaid benefici-
aries.2 88 Second, they do not cover the uninsured. Third, and perhaps
most importantly from a legislative perspective, employer self-insured
health plans are exempt from state regulation mandating benefits un-
der the ERISA.28 9 Nearly sixty-five percent of Americans are covered
Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer (April 24, 1996), available in 1996
WL 441066. Several commentators have noted, however, that state mandated
coverage may actually impede a determination of the treatment's true efficacy,
because patients' incentives to enroll in clinical trials will be greatly dimin-
ished if coverage outside trials is available. See, e.g., Harness, supra note 4, at
95. At least one insurer has recognized this problem. In 1991, the Blue Cross
Blue Shield Association, the trade association representing the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plans nationwide, began a demonstration project to fund patient partici-
pation in randomized clinical trials of HDC/AMBT for breast cancer. See Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Association Setting Precedent by Funding Clinical Tri-
als for Women with Advanced Breast Cancer, TRANSPLANT NEWS (Nov. 17,
1995), available in 1995 WL 10121002 [hereinafter TRANSPLANT NEWS]. Over
the course of the five-year demonstration project, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield
Plans were expected to contribute about $40 million dollars to a serious of
NCI-approved Phase III randomized clinical trials, which were expected to in-
clude about 1,500 women. See Mary Ader, Access to Investigational Treat-
ments, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 187, 197 (1996). One of the reasons for the estab-
lishment of the demonstration project was the recognition that simply provid-
ing coverage for the treatment, as many other insurers did and as some were
required to do, would impede research on the actual efficacy of the treatment.
See TRANSPLANT NEWS, supra note 287. As of this writing, no results of the
demonstration project have been published. However, not all states and/or in-
surers will necessarily acknowledge and react to this problem. Thus, legislation
focused on coverage for participation in clinical trials, rather than coverage for
a particular treatment, will be more effective in achieving the short term goal
of increased patient access to promising treatments and the long term goal of
development of efficacy information. See Harness, supra note 4, at 95.
288. But see infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text, discussing pro-
posed legislation to cover Medicare beneficiaries.
289. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739
(1985). In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts
statute, requiring health plans to provide a certain minimum of mental health
coverage, "regulated insurance" as specified in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(known as the "Savings Clause"), and thus was not pre-empted by ERISA as it
applied to purchased insurance plans. 471 U.S. at 379. However, the Court
noted that ERISA pre-empts the statute as applied to self-insured employers,
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by ERISA self-insured plans. 290 Self-insured plans of all types cover
about 100 million people and pay over $100 billion a year in
benefits. 29' These numbers will only continue to grow as employers
recognize the benefits of being self-insured, namely, insulation from
state regulation.292 Accordingly, federal legislation is necessary to
prevent self-insured employers from circumventing state legislation to
provide coverage for clinical trials.
VI. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
A. Regulation of Medicare
While over half of the people who have cancer are over sixty-
five,29a Medicare does not cover the patient care costs associated with
participation in clinical trials. 2 94 The federal law governing Medicare
excludes services from coverage when they are not "reasonable and
necessary for ... treatment of illness. 295 More specifically, Medicare
regulations specifically exclude participation in clinical trials from
296coverage. Despite this policy, a recent GAO report concluded that
Medicare actually does reimburse for certain costs associated with
clinical trials, up to as much as fifty percent of claims made under Part
because, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B) (known as the "Deemer
Clause"), such employers could not be deemed to practice in the business of
insurance and thus could not be saved from preemption under the Savings
Clause. For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of ERISA pre-emption,
see generally Weisenbom, supra note 147.
290. See Weisenbom, supra note 147, at 155. "Self-insurance" includes a
number of financial arrangements: (1) No Insurance, where the employee plan
is totally at risk for all health claims, (2) Stop-Loss Insurance, where the em-
ployer or health and welfare plan is insured for catastrophic cases above a cer-
tain stop-loss amount. There is no insurance below these stop-loss limits,
which is where the vast majority of claims fall. (3) Minimum Premium Insur-
ance, which is similar to stop-loss insurance and (4) HMO Prepayment. See
Weller, supra note 152, at 312.
291. See Weller, supra note 152, at 308.
292. See id. at 309.
293. See 145 Cong. Rec. E37-03 (1999) (testimony of Representative Bent-
sen) [hereinafter Bentsen testimony].
294. See id.; Smeltz, supra note 142, at 546.
295. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1998).
296. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(o)(2) (1998).
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B and fifteen percent of claims made under Part A.297 However,
Medicare coverage decisions do not follow pre-established guidelines,
but instead turn on physicians' and hospitals' abilities to convince
HCFA to cover such costs. 298 Medicare-covered patients are thus tak-
ing a gamble when enrolling in a clinical trial. This lack of Medicare
reimbursement of these costs, therefore, severely impedes the goal of
ensuring cancer patients access to clinical trials.
Presently, a bill is pending in Congress which would require Medi-
care to reimburse patient s for "routine patient care costs" associated
with participation in a federally approved clinical trial. 299 The pro-
posed legislation, entitled "The Medicare Clinical Trial Coverage Act
of 1999," defines "routine patient care costs" as "items and services
that . . . would otherwise be covered under [Medicare] if such items
and services were not provided in connection with a Federally ap-
proved clinical trial and . . . are furnished according to the design of a
Federally approved clinical trial."300 Under the present version of this
bill, a patient would not be denied coverage of routine medical care
costs simply because she enters a clinical trial. The legislation would
apply to all types of Medicare plans, including Medicare managed care
plans, and importantly, to all three phases of clinical trials.30 ' To en-
sure coverage, a clinical trial needs approval from any of the follow-
ing: the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the NIH, the FDA,
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec-
retary of Energy, a non-governmental research entity as defined by the
NIH or a peer-review and approved research program as defined by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.30 2 The legislation would
also require the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Sec-
retary of Labor to jointly prepare a report on the costs associated with
requiring health plans to reimburse patients for routine medical care
costs associated with participation in clinical trials.30 3
The bill's sponsor, Representative' Ken Bentsen (D-Tx.), believes
the legislation would increase participation in clinical trials and lead
297. See Bentsen testimony, supra note 293.
298. See id.
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to faster development of therapies for life-threatening diseases. 304 He
argues that Medicare reimbursement of routine patient care costs asso-
ciated with clinical trials would encourage other health plans to pro-
vide coverage. 30 5 Representative Bentsen also believes the reports re-
quired by the legislation on the costs associated with reimbursement
will likely reveal that covering clinical trial costs is actually cost-
effective, thereby ensuring that all health plans will provide access to
clinical trials.30 6
This is not the first time Representative Bentsen has introduced this
legislation. He introduced the exact same bill in 1998, although no
action took place.30 7 In addition, it is not the only proposal for Medi-
care coverage of patient care costs associated with clinical trials. Bills
are currently pending in both the Senate and the House that would es-
tablish a demonstration project to study and provide coverage of rou-
tine patient care costs for Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in approved
cancer clinical trials. 308  The definitions for "routine patient care
costs" and approved clinical trials in these bills mirror those included
in Representative Bentsen's bill. 30 9  The legislation, entitled the
"Medicare Cancer Clinical Trial Coverage Act of 1999," would man-
date Medicare coverage of costs associated with cancer clinical trials
for a five-year period. 3t0  At the conclusion of the five-year demon-
stration period, the legislation would require the Secretary to submit a
report to Congress outlining any incremental costs to the Medicare
program as a result of coverage of costs associated with cancer clinical
trials. The report must also include a projection of expenditures if
coverage of such costs were extended to individuals with a diagnosis
other than cancer.311 This legislation is narrower than Representative
Bentsen's proposal because it would limit coverage to cancer clinical
trials and expire after five years. The goals of the two bills, however,
are very similar and either would be a step in the direction of ensuring
304. See Bentsen testimony, supra note 293.
305. See id. See also Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1408, (examined plan including
availability of HCFA reimbursement as a factor in determining whether a
treatment was experimental.).
306. See Bentsen testimony, supra note 293.
307. See H.R. 3283, 105th Cong. (1997).





older Americans access to clinical trials.
Finally, the Clinton Administration recognizes the problems caused
by lack of reimbursement for clinical trial costs and proposed a dem-
onstration project of its own. 312 The Clinton proposal would be a
three-year demonstration project, similar to the one proposed in Con-
gress' bill. 31 3 The project, estimated to cost $750 million, would be
supported by funds from the comprehensive tobacco legislation.314
The project would coincide with an increase in funding of sixty-five
percent over five years for cancer research at the NIH.315
B. Regulation of Private Insurance Carriers
As discussed supra, employer self-insured health plans are exempt
from any state regulation mandating coverage of participation in clini-
cal trials. 316 To counter self-insurers exemption from regulation, ac-
tion must be taken at the federal level to require these plans to cover
such costs. Congress could achieve this goal either by exempting
health plans from ERISA altogether, thus leaving all health plans open
to state regulation, or by amending ERISA to require ERISA-covered
plans to reimburse beneficiaries for patient care costs associated with
clinical trials.
The first alternative does not have much support in Congress and is
probably not the most efficient way to guarantee access to clinical tri-
als. The purpose of ERISA was to achieve uniformity in employment
law, 317 which is why Congress "has been reluctant to restructure the
ERISA preemption to allow states to implement health care reform be-
cause of the perceived need for such uniformity.,, 318 Congress does
not seek to burden companies operating in more than one state by
subjecting them to each state's regulation. 319 One commentator sug-
gests a solution to this problem, which would require a major overhaul
312. See Laurent Castellucci, Gore Champions Major New Cancer Initia-




316. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
317. See Scott D. Litman, Health Care Reform for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: The Need for a Federal and State Partnership, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
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of health care regulation. 320 Specifically, the proposal would require:
(1) a federal law mandating that all states provide a minimum benefits
package, (2) a federal ERISA exemption for health care, which would
allow the states' minimum benefits packages to apply to all insurers,
and (3) a federal law mandating that all self-insuring employers with
operations in five or more states respect the minimum benefit laws of
either their state of incorporation or their principle place of
business.321 Under this scenario, total coverage of patient costs asso-
ciated with clinical trials would require all fifty states to include such
coverage in their minimum benefits package. 322 This legislation ap-
pears more cumbersome than the legislative changes discussed in the
next section. At any rate, no other legislation is currently pending that
would have such broad implications.323
The second alternative, however, is supported in Congress and has
become part of the great debate on health care reform. In March 1997,
President Clinton appointed the Advisory Commission on Consumer
Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry and asked it to
draft a "Consumer Bill of Rights., 324 The Commission presented the
bill to the President in November of 1997.325 The bill consisted of
seven major areas of consumer rights including: Information Disclo-
sure, Choice of Provider and Plans, Access to Emergency Services,
Participation in Treatment Decisions, Respect and Nondiscrimination,
320. See id. at 911.
321. See id.
322. There are, of course, federalism arguments that this is the more ap-
propriate way to regulate health care benefits. See generally James E. Hollo-
way, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Callfor
"Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in Formulating Health
Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 405 (1994) (arguing that the dominance of
federal regulation in the field of medical care ... "accelerate[s] the decline of
federalism by restricting states' ability to concern themselves with local medi-
cal care needs and to use local employment-based resources in formulating a
comprehensive state health care policy.").
323. The closest proposed legislation that has come to this alternative is to
exempt from ERISA pre-emption state tort and breach of contract claims. See
generally sources cited infra notes 337, 339, 344, 346 and 351.
324. See Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the
Health Care Industry, Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, Report to
the President of the United States (Nov. 1997), reprinted in Havighurst, supra
note 109, at 1277.
325. See id.
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Confidentiality of Health Information, and Complaints and Appeals.
326
Under the heading of "Participation in Treatment Decisions," the
Commission recommended that patients receive the right to be advised
of all treatment options, ostensibly including participation in clinical
trials.
327
The Commission's work quickly translated into many bills intro-
duced during the 105th Congress, none of which were passed into
law.328 Most of these bills recommended amending ERISA to require
ERISA-covered plans to adhere to the patient rights established, thus
eliminating the ERISA preemption problem. 329 In addition, these bills
recommended amending the Public Health Service Act, which would
subject all non-ERISA state-regulated health plans to the proposed
law's requirements, thereby establishing a national minimum floor of
patients' rights.330 At least one bill has even suggested amending the
Medicaid statute.33' Some type of health reform to address patient
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 1276.
329. See sources cited infra notes 337, 339, 344, 346 and 351.
330. See id. In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed into
law the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Pub. L.
No.104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA]. In furtherance of the
statute's goal to guarantee continued availability of health care coverage to
employees and their spouses and dependents who have group health insurance,
it added a new title to the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-299
(1994) [hereinafter PHSA], which brings federal regulation to private health
insurance issuers that before had been primarily subject to state regulatory
control. See Jack A. Rovner, Federal Regulation Comes to Private Health
Care Financing: The Group Health Insurance Provisions of the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 183,
185 (1998). The addition has been used to create federal minimum health in-
surance benefits, such as minimum hospital lengths of stay after childbirth.
See The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-204, §§ 601-606, Stat. 2874, 2935 (1996), and financial parity of mental
health benefits with medical benefits. See The Mental Health Parity Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 701-703, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944 (1996). Note
that amendments to the PHSA do not prevent states from legislating require-
ments that are more stringent. See Rovner, at 211-12. See also the bills dis-
cussed in this section, which all provide for state legislation which is stricter
than the proposed requirements.
331. See S. 1499, 105th Cong. (1997).
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rights in managed care had broad bipartisan support, a32 however, spe-
cific proposals differed along party lines. In general, the Democratic
bills provided for broader protection of patients' rights, including
mandated coverage of participation in clinical trials.
For example, in the House of Representatives, Representative Ding-
ell (D-MI) introduced the "Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998. '33
The bill would have required health plans to cover "routine patient
costs" of individuals participating in "approved clinical trials" if: (1)
the individual has a life-threatening or serious illness for which no
standard treatment is effective, (2) the individual is eligible to partici-
pate in an approved clinical trial, (3) the individual's participation in
the trial "offers meaningful potential for significant clinical benefit for
the individual," and (4) either the individual's referring physician has
concluded that the individual's participation in the trial would be ap-
propriate or the individual provides medical and scientific information
establishing that her participation would be appropriate. 334 Under this
proposed bill, an "approved clinical trial" was defined as one ap-
proved and funded by either the NIH, a cooperative group or center of
the NIH, the VA or the DoD.335 The bill would have allowed managed
care organizations to require patient participation in a trial conducted
by a provider that participates in the plan as opposed to a trial con-
ducted by a non-participating provider, as long as the participating
provider accepts the patient into the trial.336
Although some of the bill's language appeared ambiguous, 337 this
legislation clearly required private health plans to cover costs of at
least some of their patients participating in clinical trials. A similar
bill, containing identical language and also entitled the "Patients' Bill
of Rights," was introduced in the Senate.338 Senator Edward Kennedy
(D-MA) described the reasoning behind this portion of the bill as fol-
lows:
Access to quality clinical trials is particularly impor-
tant. These trials are often the only hope for patients
332. See Misocky, supra note 100, at 60.




337. See id. For example, it is not clear what is meant by "meaningful po-
tential for significant clinical benefit for the individual?"
338. See S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998)
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with incurable cancer or other diseases where conven-
tional treatments are ineffective. They are the best hope
for curing these dreaded [sic] diseases .... Too often,
managed care is locking patients out of clinical trials
that offerotential benefit - in effect, passing a death
sentence.
The Republican bills, by contrast, were significantly less protective
of patients' rights, especially with regard to clinical trial participation.
For example, in the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich (R-GA)
introduced the "Patient Protection Act of 1998.340 This bill did not
mandate coverage of participation in clinical trials, but merely re-
quired a plan to disclose information about experimental treatments
that are not covered, such as clinical trial participation. 341 A similar
bill was also introduced in the Senate.342
In July of 1998, the House passed the Gingrich bill described
above,343 however, the Dingell bill was defeated by just five votes.344
No further action was taken by the 105th Congress. However, many
bills similar or identical to these have already been introduced in the
106th Congress 345 and on October 7, 1999, the House passed a bill
identical to the 1998 Dingell bill entitled the "Bipartisan Consensus
Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.,,346
339. 144 Cong Rec. Si1155-01 (Sept. 30, 1998) (testimony of Senator
Kennedy).
340. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998).
341. See id.
342. See S. 2230, 105th Cong. (1998).
343. See House Passes GOP Managed Care Bill: Clinton Administration
Threatens Veto, 6 Health Care Policy Report (BNA) (July 27, 1998).
344. See id.
345. See, e.g., H.R. 719, 106th Cong. (1999) (Managed Care Reform Act
of 1999) (providing for coverage of clinical trials); S. 374, 106th Cong. (1999)
(Promoting Responsibility in Managed Care Act of 1999); H.R. 358, 106th
Cong. (1999) (Patients Bill of Rights Act of 1999); S. 240, 106th Cong. (Pa-
tients Bill of Rights Act of 1999); H.R. 448, 106th Cong. (1999) (Patient Pro-
tection Act of 1999) (not providing coverage for participation in clinical trials);
S. 326, 106th Cong. (1999) (Patients Bill of Rights Act of 1999).
346. See H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999). See also Clinical Trial Costs
Covered, The Blue Sheet, Vol. 42 Issue 41 (Wednesday, Oct. 13, 1999), avail-
able in 1999 WL 10784129.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to expand patient access to clinical trials, Congress should
pass legislation, like the Dingell bill, which substantively regulates
health plans, rather than just imposes disclosure requirements on them,
requiring reimbursement to patients for costs associated with clinical
trials. It makes sense in the short and long term for third parties to
reimburse for basic patient care costs associated with participation in
all Phases of clinical trials. Recent efforts on the part of the federal
government and private insurance carriers to improve patient access to
clinical trials indicate that these parties are at least willing to explore
some of the benefits of such reimbursement. However, because of the
short term emphasis on costs of participation in clinical trials and be-
cause of the collective action problem plaguing insurers' reliance on
long term benefits, this coverage choice should not be left in the hands
of the individual insurer. Not only will reliance on individual insurers
result in inconsistent coverage for this important treatment, it will also
result, as it already has to some extent, in costly, time-consuming liti-
gation.
Relying on states to mandate coverage is also inefficient, because of
the time it will take for all fifty states to pass legislation and because
of the enormous gap left by ERISA pre-emption, Medicare, and Medi-
caid coverage. Therefore, the best solution is for Congress to pass
legislation establishing mandated coverage of these costs by all insur-
ers, including ERISA-covered plans, Medicare, and Medicaid. This
can be achieved by amending ERISA, the PHSA, and the Social Secu-
rity Act, all of which has already been suggested in Congress. By
passing such legislation, Congress will ensure access of seriously ill
patients to treatment that may be their best alternative. In addition, it
will ensure the advancement of clinical research for life-threatening
diseases. Congress should not pass up this opportunity to take a large
step in the battle against cancer and other killers.
